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Abstract
The combination of recent emerging technologies such as network function virtualization (NFV)
and network programmability (SDN) gave birth to the novel Network Slicing paradigm. 5G networks
consist of multi-tenant infrastructures capable of offering leased network “slices” to new customers (e.g.,
vertical industries) enabling a new telecom business model: Slice-as-a-Service (SlaaS). However, as the
service demand gets increasingly dense, slice requests congestion may occur leading to undesired waiting
periods. This may turn into impatient tenant behaviors that increase potential loss. In this paper, we aim
to i) study the slicing admission control problem by means of a multi-queuing system for heterogeneous
tenant requests, ii) derive its statistical behavior model, iii) find out the rational strategy of impatient
tenants waiting in queue-based slice admission control systems, iv) prove mathematically and empirically
the benefits of allowing infrastructure providers to share its information with the upcoming tenants, and
v) provide a utility model for network slices admission optimization. Our results analyze the capability
of the proposed SlaaS system to be approximately Markovian and evaluate its performance as compared
to a baseline solution.
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1Multiservice-based Network Slicing
Orchestration with Impatient Tenants
I. INTRODUCTION
Network Slicing [1] is an emerging 5G technology that allows infrastructure providers to offer
“slices” of resources (computational, storage and networking) to network tenants. In this way
a new business game [2] is introduced as infrastructure providers (sellers) strategically decide
which tenants (buyers) get granted slices to deliver their services. Intuitively, this involves a
number of challenges that fall in the economic research field, which, in turn, requires a detailed
understanding of the context. In particular, the infrastructure provider may rely on this emerging
technology as a means to increase its revenue sources. However, to achieve the overall revenue
maximization, advanced admission control policies are required as tenants compete for a limited
set of available resources.
In this competing environment, a brokering solution may act as a mediator between seller
and buyers while providing service level agreements (SLAs) guarantees to granted running
slices [3]. Admission control policies will guide the broker in the process of deciding the set of
network slices that can be installed on the system and the ones to be rejected. As the number of
network slices grows—as envisioned for the next few years [4]—it will be necessary to design an
automated solution that dynamically decides on the received slice requests while guaranteeing a
certain degree of fairness among network tenants. Indeed, network slice requests may be queued
while waiting for the next available resources, or may be re-issued.
To properly design such a slicing brokering process, a deep understanding of the slice queuing
behavior is needed that accounts, for e.g. the average slice duration (based on the slice type),
the frequency of slice requests (based on the tenant), etc. This enables a Slice-as-a-Service
(SlaaS) [5] solution that fully supports on-demand slices requests: tenants issue slice requests
for given periods of time and decide whether to re-issue the same request upon rejection based
on service level agreements. Advanced slicing admission control solutions may have different
policies for tenants frequently asking for short-term slices—such as Internet-of-Things (IoT),
or crowded event-based network slices—as they will automatically re-issue the same request
in the near future, with respect to those that require only few longer network slices—such as
Mobile Virtual Network Operators (MVNOs) or Industrial Network Slices [6]—which may be
probably lost if not accepted. Moreover, similar as widely recognized in all kinds of queuing
systems for service scheduling, tenants may be impatient and choose to leave for another available
infrastructure provider instead of waiting in a queue, especially when the expected waiting time
is long. Such behavior shall also be taken into account while designing a slicing admission
control solution to mitigate potential revenues loss in case of resource congestion.
While conventional admission control problems have been extensively studied in the literature,
we pioneer a new stochastic model for network slicing that leverages on the multi-queuing
system to optimally design an admission control of on-demand network slices as well as to
orchestrate them once are accepted. This also allows to account for impatient tenant behaviors and
heterogeneous network slice characteristics while, at the same time, enforcing given performance
metrics, such as fairness between different tenants or between network slice types or utility-based
maximization.
2II. MODEL DESIGN
We cast our problem into a typical network slicing scenario, where the Mobile Network
Operator (MNO) decides to lease infrastructure resources to tenants, willing to pay to take over
the control of an independent network slice so as to deliver an end-service to their own users.
Hereafter, we describe our assumptions and mathematically formulate the problem.
A. Resource pool and slice types
Let us consider a single MNO that possesses a static resource pool of M different resources and
offers N = |N | pre-defined types of slices. Depending on the slice type n ∈ N , it costs a certain
resource bundle to create and maintain a slice. Let r = [r1, r2, . . . , rM]T, s = [s1, s2, . . . , sN ]T
and cn = [c1,n, c2,n, . . . , cM,n]T denote the resource pool, the set of active slices and the resource
bundle required to maintain a slice of type n ∈ N , respectively. The assigned resources can be
then represented as
a ∆= [a1, a2, . . . , aM]T = C × s, (1)
where C = [c1, c2, . . . , cN ]. At any time instance, the MNO cannot simultaneously maintain more
slices than its resource pool may support. This constraint is expressed using the feasibility region
[7]:
S = {s|rm − am ≥ 0, ∀1 ≤ m ≤ M}. (2)
Note that S is a finite discrete set, thus the MNO can be characterized as a finite state machine
where each active slice set represents the system state s ∈ S.
B. Slice admission in SlaaS
We consider a certain number of tenants randomly generating network slice requests. Slices
requested by a certain tenant are of the same type. For each tenant, the inter-arrival time between
two requests is drawn from an exponential distribution. The request arrivals of different tenants
are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.).
Once a request for slice creation is triggered, the MNO makes a binary decision, i.e., the MNO
either accepts or declines it. Upon acceptance, the requested slice is created, and continuously
maintained so that a corresponding bundle of network resources is occupied until the slice is
terminated (at the end of its lifetime) and the resource bundle is released. It should be noted
that the constraint of feasibility region forbids the MNO to accept any request when its current
state is close to the border of S. In other words, if the current MNO resource pool is close
to be saturated by active slices, it does not accept additional network slice requests that might
experience a service disruption. This introduces the well-known concept of admissibility region1
described as
A = {s|s ∈ S, ∃n : s + ∆sn ∈ S}, (3)
where ∆sn is the unit slice incremental vector of type n
∆sn = [0, . . . , 0︸  ︷︷  ︸
n−1
, 1, 0, . . . , 0︸  ︷︷  ︸
N−n
], n ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N}. (4)
Fig. 1 briefly illustrates the concepts of S and A with an example where M = 2, N = 2.
1The admissibility region has been exhaustively studied in the literature for different use cases and scenarios. We refer the
reader to [8], where a stochastic admissibility region is derived for a network slicing admission control.
3Fig. 1: The network resource utilization can be described with the set of active slices s, which
always falls in the feasibility region S. The admissibility region A is a proper subset of S.
We assume that the lifetime of every slice is an i.i.d. exponentially distributed variable and
the expected lifetime depends on the slice type. We also consider that the MNO makes every
decision according to a consistent slicing policy, i.e., the decision depends only on the type of
requested slice n and the current system state s that defines the current set of active slices.
C. Delayed reattempt upon request denial
If a request for slice creation is declined—because of a temporary shortage of available
resources due to many other active slices—the tenant is not able to obtain the requested slice
immediately. Instead, its request may be sent to the MNO again for a reconsideration after some
delay with the hope that some running slice has expired (i.e., resources have been released).
Generally, there are two critical features of the delaying mechanism, which should be taken into
account: i) resource efficiency and ii) fairness. The former requires that the chosen mechanism
purses the resource pool utilization maximization whereas the latter requires that the expected
delay for different requests is normalized.
Two categories of approaches are commonly used to solve this kind of problem:
Random delay. Every declined request is re-proposed to the MNO after a random delay. This
approach provides a good fairness, but generates extra signaling overhead in the control plane
while being not able to provide the discipline of “First Come, First Served” (FCFS), as described
in the next section.
Queuing. Declined requests wait in one or multiple queue(s) for the next opportunity during the
MNO’s decisional process. This is the most common solution in cloud service scheduling.
Hereafter, we show how a multi-queuing system may be fully exploited to provide insights
on the system behaviors and pave the road towards a slicing orchestration solution.
III. NETWORK SLICING QUEUING
In the literature a number of various disciplines have been studied to serve the request queues.
Among the others, the most common policies are i) First come, first served (FCFS), ii) Last
4come, first served (LCFS), iii) Random selection for service (RSS) and iv) Priority-based (PR).
All of them analyze different behaviors and are used to achieve distinct performance metrics. For
instance, the LCFS is used to reduce the fairness whereas the priority-based is implemented when
there is some high-level preference of the MNO to be considered. RSS shows huge complexity
in the implementation without bringing any significant advantage with respect to the others.
Hereafter, we focus on the FCFS case. However, any other discipline may be easily adapted to
our analysis.
A. Queuing schemes
We differentiate the queuing systems into two different categories: i) single-queue and ii)
multi-queue systems. When considering the single-queue, only one queue is implemented for all
declined requests that need to wait for the next acceptance opportunity. Conversely, the multi-
queue system implements multiple queue for declined requests. Specifically, such queues may
show different features. We consider homogeneous-mixed queues, wherein each queue consists
of requests for slices of different types, and heterogeneous queues, where each queue is specified
for only one unique slice type. We next show a simple case-study to justify that the queuing
system is suitable for this kind of problems.
B. Resource efficiency: a simple case-study
Consider a simplified case where M = 1, N = 2, r = [1], c1 = [0.6], c2 = [0.2] and s = [1, 0]T.
The first four requests awaiting in the queue(s) are in the sequential order [1, 1, 2, 2]. The MNO
is taking a greedy strategy that intends to accept all requests received so far the resource pool
supports.
Both in the schemes with a single queue and two homogeneous queues, the MNO fails to
accept requests of type 2 as the type 1 requests are preventing their acceptance. Hence, it has
to wait until the currently active slice of type 1 is released before it can accept the next request
in the queue, although it has both enough idle resource and the intention. The heterogeneous
multi-queue scheme, in contrast, enables the MNO to fully utilize its resource pool as shown in
Fig. 2.
Fig. 2: A simple case study on different queuing schemes.
5Obviously, both the single-queue and the homogeneous multi-queue schemes can also over-
come this issue by introducing a “queue-jumping” mechanism. However, this may require an
extra design of (more complex) logic that automatically (and dynamically) decides which request
is allowed to jump in the queue(s). Therefore, in this study we consider the scheme with N FCFS
heterogeneous queues.
IV. HETEROGENEOUS MULTI-QUEUE ADMISSION CONTROL
Based on the heterogeneous multi-queue scheme, we propose in this section a novel code to
present the MNO’s preference for different slice types in variable states, a multi-queue admission
controller for SlaaS, and analyze its queue model.
A. Slice-type preference encoder
Differing from existing studies that do not consider queuing and the single-queue scheme, in
the multi-queue scheme, the MNO may receive multiple requests for slices of different types
simultaneously. Therefore, instead of making a simple binary decision of accepting or declining
one request, it has to either choose one from the simultaneously arriving requests to accept
while declining the rest ones, or decline all of them. Especially, with heterogeneous queues, the
MNO’s preference for some request queue(s) over the others implies its proclivity to some slice
type(s) against the others.
For an MNO that offers N different slice types to tenants for request, we can encode an
arbitrary preference of the MNO into a preference vector of length N + 1:
Φ = [ϕ1, ϕ2, . . . , ϕN+1], (5)
which is a permutation of {0, 1, 2, . . . , N}. The earlier a queue number 1 ≤ n ≤ N occurs in
Φ, the more likely the MNO prefers slice type n over the others. Note that n = 0 denotes
reserving resource for potential opportunities in future, so that all requests in the queues with
values occurring in Φ after 0 will not be served by the MNO at all.
While being in states on (or close to) the border of feasibility region s ∈ S − A, the MNO
cannot accept further request from any queue, hence the preference does not make any impact.
Thus, we focus on the admissibility region A and assume that the MNO’s preference is consistent
and depends only on its current state s ∈ A. Thus, we can characterize the MNO’s admission
strategy with a (N + 1) × |A| preference matrix as the following
Φ = [Φ1,Φ2, . . . ,Φ|A|]
=

φ1,1 φ1,2 . . . φ1,|A|
φ2,1 φ2,2 . . . φ2,|A|
...
...
. . .
...
φN+1,1 φN+1,2 . . . φN+1,|A|
 ,
(6)
where each column Φi represents the MNO’s preference for different slice types in a specific
feasible state in A.
B. Mechanism overview
Let ln denote the length of the nth queue, the decision entity executes the algorithm described
in Fig. 3. The MNO keeps waiting for incoming tenant issues and responses to them upon issue
arrivals. If the tenant issues to release a slice of its own, the MNO always releases it. If the
6tenant requests for a new slice, the request will be pushed into the corresponding queue with
respect to the type of requested slice. After responding to the issue, the MNO will recursively
serve the request queues in a sequence determined by its admission strategy and active slice set,
until no more waiting request can be accepted. Then it stops serving the queues and waits for
the next tenant issue.
V. NETWORK SLICING CONTROLLER DESIGN
We analyze different characteristics of the conventional queuing models, highlighting the novel
features applied to our model while designing the network slicing controller. This helps to shed
light on the main advantages and limitations of our novel admission control model.
A. Analysis of inter-acceptance time
We consider request arrivals of every slice type as an independent Poisson process, so that the
inter-arrival time between requests in every queue is an independent exponential random process.
Conversely, the request acceptance rate of every queue is jointly determined by the slice releases
of all types, and the MNO’s preference strategy.
Theorem 1. Consider a heterogeneous multi-queue slice admission controller that executes the
algorithm in Fig. 3(a) with a consistent preference matrix. The acceptance in different queues
are mutually independent Poisson processes, if: 1) the arrivals of new requests and releases of
active slices are mutually independent Poisson processes for every individual slice type; 2) the
arrivals of different slice types are mutually independent from each other, the releases of different
slice types are mutually independent from each other.
Proof. First, extend the system (MNO) state s with all queue lengths to obtain the controller
state sˆ = [s, l1, l2, . . . , lN ], and therefore the infinite discrete domain Aˆ = A×NN . Let the bijection
A↔ {1, 2, . . . , |A|} denoted by I = IA(s), we call sˆ ∈ Aˆ a transient state if ∃n ∈ N such that:
φI,k , 0, ∀k < n;
ln > 0;(
s + ∆sφn,I
) ∈ A.
(7)
(8)
(9)
Otherwise, we call sˆ a steady state. According to the algorithm in Fig. 3(a), when the controller
is in a transient state it always accepts a request in its queues immediately and therefore keeps
jumping to another state until it reaches a steady state. Every transient state leads to one and
only one certain steady state. On the other hand, the controller can reasonably (but not always)
leave a steady state only when a new request arrives or a slice is released.
Thus, given a certain sequence of request arriving and slice releasing events in the next period,
we can obtain the transition path of the controller state, and therewith determine whether the
first awaiting request in an arbitrary queue will be accepted during that period. Denote the time
that the first awaiting request in the nth queue still has to wait until it is accepted as tw,n, it yields
that
Prob(tw,n > T) = 1 −
∏
e∈En
Prob(Arr(T) = e), (10)
where En is the set of all event sequences that can lead to an acceptance of request in the nth
queue, and Arr(T) denotes the event sequence arriving in the next period of T . As the request
arrivals and releases of different slice types are mutually independent Poisson processes, we
7Initialize with certain N , S, A, Φ and s;
while True do Main loop
Wait for the next incoming tenant issue;
if Slice of type n released then Releasing a slice
s← s − ∆sn;
else if Slice of type n requested then Request arrives
ln ← ln + 1;
end
while s ∈ A do Recursively serving the queues until blocked
s˜← s;
Find the current preference vector Φ according to Φ and s;
for 1 ≤ n ≤ N do Serve queues w.r.t. preference
if ϕn = 0 then Omitting queues after 0
break;
else if ln > 0 AND (s + ∆sn) ∈ S then Acceptance
ln ← ln − 1;
s← s + ∆sn;
end
end
if s˜ = s then Blockage detection
Break;
end
end
end
(a) Pseudo code of the multi-queue slice admission controlling algo-
rithm.
(b) Graphical illustration.
Fig. 3: A heterogeneous multi-queue mechanism can be implemented to enable delayed slice
admission, in which a specific preference among different slice types is addressed to every state
of active slice set.
know that all e ∈ ET are also approximately Poissonian (proven as a feature of dependent trials
8[9], [10]). Thus, due to the Markovian behavior of Poisson processes, we can write the following
Prob(Arr(T) = e) = Prob(Arr(T + t) = e | Arr(t) , e)
∀[e, t,T] ∈
(
ET × N2
)
,
(11)
and thus
Prob(tw,n > T + t)
=1 −
∏
e∈En
Prob(Arr(T + t) = e | Arr(t) , e)
=Prob(tw,n > T + t | tw,n > t), ∀[t,T] ∈ N2.
(12)
Eq. (12) implies that the remaining waiting time for acceptance of the first request in queue n is
memoryless. Due to the fact that the only two classes of memoryless distributions are exponential
(continuous) and geometric (discrete) distributions, we can assert that the request acceptance in
every queue is a Poisson process. 
B. Queuing-theoretic analysis
While considering both request arrivals and request acceptances (service) as Poisson processes,
every request queue is a classic M/M/1 queuing system, known as single-server birth-death
system [11]. Hence, many features of birth-death model can be directly applied.
1) Little’s Formula: For slice type (queue) n, given its request arrival rate λn, according to
the famous Little’s formula [12] there is
Ln = λnWn, (13)
where Ln and Wn represent the mean length of queue n and the average waiting time in queue
n, respectively.
2) Steady Queue State Probability: Given the request arrival rate λn and acceptance rate µn
of queue n, the probability that the queue steadily consists of l requests at an arbitrary time
instant is geometrically distributed, i.e.,
pn(l) = (1 − ρ)ρl, (14)
where ρn = λn/µn < 1 is the work load rate of queue n.
3) Waiting Time Distribution: The probability density function (PDF) of an arbitrary type-n
request’s waiting time is
f (Wn) =
{
0 Wn < 0
(µn − λn)e−(µn−λn)Wn Wn ≥ 0 , (15)
and the cumulative density function (CDF) is
F(Wn) =
{
0 Wn < 0
1 − e−(µn−λn)Wn Wn ≥ 0 . (16)
9C. Extension: impatient tenants
From Eqs. (13–16) it is clear that both Ln and Wn converge only when λn < µn. Otherwise,
when the request acceptance rate is lower than the arrival rate in queue n, the queue length will
infinitely increase, and therefore also the mean waiting time. This is known as the necessary
and sufficient condition of statistical equilibrium in queuing processes, as stated and proven by
Kendall in work [13].
However, in a real slice admission controller, there are various situations where λn ≥ µn for
some n, including cases
• when the controller is specified with an inappropriate strategy, so that requests in the queue
n is rarely or even never accepted despite of resource feasibility;
• when the release rates of active slices are low, so that the resource pool fails to support a
sufficiently high µn regardless of any admission strategy.
There are two mechanisms that prevent queuing systems from such divergence. On the one hand,
the system may force to truncate a queue at some maximal length, and forbid this queue to take
any new request before it is shortened. On the other hand, the clients may lose patience while
waiting, and leave the queues before being served (e.g., for looking for some other MNO with
resource availability). In the scenario of SlaaS, the system (MNO) is probably very cautious with
refusing requests, while the waiting time can be critical to the customers (tenants). Therefore,
here we consider no queue truncation but queues with impatience.
Usually, impatience in queues can occur in three different behaviors: i) balking, i.e. customers
being reluctant to join a queue upon arrival, ii) reneging, i.e. customers leaving the queue after
joining and waiting, and iii) jockeying from long lines to shorter ones. As the heterogeneous
multi-queue design disables jockeying, here we consider the balking and reneging phenomena.
Balking Model. The phenomenon of balking can be modeled in such a way, that every arrival
request of slice type n enters the queue with a probability bn, which is a monotonically decreasing
function of the current queue length ln. Ancker and Gafarian have proposed two different balking
models in [14], [15]. The first model considers a linear balking factor:
1 − bn = ln/ln,max , (17)
where ln,max is the upper bound of ln for queue truncation. The second one considers a non-linear
balking factor:
1 − bn =
{
0 ln = 0;
1 − βn/ln ln ∈ N+, (18)
where βn ∈ [0, 1] measures the willingness of tenants requesting type-n slices to wait. In cases
that the tenant has knowledge about µn, Shortle et al. suggest another non-linear balking model:
1 − bn = 1 − e−βnln/µn, (19)
where βn > 0 [11].
Reneging Model. The phenomenon of reneging can be modeled by randomly assigning an
individual maximal waiting time to every request when it joins the queue. The request will leave
the queue after that maximal waiting time if it has not been accepted yet. Ancker and Gafarian
[15] have proposed to model the maximal waiting time for every type-n request as an exponential
random variable:
Wmax ,n ∼ Exp(αn), (20)
where 1/αn > 0 is the mean maximal waiting time in queue n.
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Here we consider the exponential balking and reneging models described by Eq. (19) and
Eq. (20), respectively. We will justify this choice later in Section VI. Before that, we first continue
analyzing the performance of out heterogeneous multi-queue slice admission controller, taking
into account the impatience of tenants.
D. Performances with balking and reneging
It should be noted that the balking and reneging processes are with memory, leading to a non-
Markovian behavior of request acceptances. However, under low balking and reneging rates, this
impact can be negligible and the acceptance process can still be approximated as Poissonian.
When the balking and reneging rates rise to significant levels, the memory of acceptance process
shall be considered, as demonstrated in Section VIII-B1 by means of simulations.
Under a combination of exponential balking and exponential reneging, the steady state prob-
ability of having l requests in the queue n is
pn(l) =

(
1 +
+∞∑
j=1
Γ(γn+1)( λnδ
j
n
αn
)l
Γ(l+γn+1)
)−1
l = 0
pn(0)
l∏
j=1
λnδ
j
n
µ+ jαn
l ∈ N+
, (21)
where γn = µn/αn, δn = e−βn/µn and Γ(·) is the Gamma function. A detailed calculation is
provided in the appendix.
Meanwhile, we are interested in three different distributions of waiting time spent in a queue
n: i) fa(Wn) for requests that are eventually accepted, ii) fr(Wn) for requests that renege and
iii) fq(Wn) for all requests that join the queue. Let us define An and Jn as the events of request
being accepted and joining the queue n, respectively. Following the analysis approach used in
[14], [15], there are
P(Jn) =
+∞∑
j=1
pn( j)δ jn (22)
P(An) = pn(0) +
+∞∑
j=1
pn( j)δ jnγn
γn + j
, (23)
P(An, Jn) =
+∞∑
j=1
pn( j)δ jnγn
γn + j
, (24)
P(An |Jn) = P(An, Jn)P(Jn) . (25)
It can be obtained that
fa(Wn) =pn(0)αne
−(µn+αn)Wn
P(An, Jn)
+∞∑
l=1
(
1 − e−αnWn ) l δ l(l+1)2n
l!(l − 1)! (26)
fr(Wn) =αne−αnWn 1 − P(An |Jn)g(Wn)1 − P(An |Jn)) , (27)
fq(Wn) =P(An |Jn)
[
fa(Wn) − αne−αnWng(Wn)
]
+ αne−αnWn, (28)
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where g(Wn) =
∫ Wn
0 e
αnξ fa(ξ)dξ.
The expectations of waiting times are therefore
Wa,n =
+∞∫
0
fa(Wn)dWn, (29)
W r,n =
1
αn
− P(An |Jn)Wa,n
1 − P(An |Jn) , (30)
Wq,n =
1 − P(An |Jn)
αn
. (31)
VI. DECISION ANALYSIS OF IMPATIENT TENANTS
To decide which models shall be used to describe the behavior of impatient tenants in the
SlaaS scenario, we take the tenant’s point of view and consider the business model of every
individual tenant service instance through its life cycle. A rational strategy of impatience shall
be obtained from the perspective of decision making by tenants.
A. Tenant business model
Generally, the motivation of tenants to request network slices is to fulfill the end-user service
demands from their own customers. For simplification, here we consider w.l.o.g. that for every
certain tenant, every service demand can be supported by one slice of the same type. Once
a tenant is granted with the requested network slice, it launches its business session to deliver
service to the end-users. The duration of a business session, i.e. the lifetime of the corresponding
network slice, is a random variable, that is known by the tenant before issuing the slice request
and established in the Service-Level-Agreement (SLA) upon slice admission.
It can take the tenant a one-time cost u0 to issue the service request to the MNO, which is
used to issue the request and prepare the end-user service. Besides, this cost may also covers
part (or even the whole lump) of the rent for requested network slice, which the MNO may
also requires the tenants to prepay as deposit in advance. Additionally, when a request waits in
queue, it can consistently generate a periodical waiting cost u for the tenant, which is used to
keep the tenant standby for launching the business session.
Once a request is accepted, a new network slice will be created and granted to the corre-
sponding tenant to support the desired end-user service. This service is supposed to generate a
periodic revenue Rev that we assume as known or well predictable by the tenant. Meanwhile,
the tenant has to pay a periodical expenditure Exp that is composed by the operations cost to
maintain the service, and the residential rent for the network slice in case that the rent is not
completely prepaid to the MNO in the request-issuing phase. We can assume w.l.o.s. that the
periodical profit ζ = Rev−Exp is always positive – as the tenant will never issue such a request
otherwise.
B. Rational balking & reneging strategies
An arbitrary request can be characterized by a feature vector [n, u0, u, ζ, τ], where n is the slice
type, τ is the expected life time of slice upon acceptance, u0, u and ζ are the business model
parameters discussed in Section VI-A. Meanwhile, the queue of slice type n can be characterized
by [l, λ, µ] where l − 1 is its current queue length, λ and µ are the arrival rate and serving rate
of type-n requests, respectively.
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When the business demand arises, i.e. request is generated (not issued yet) by the tenant, the
expected total profit that this business session can generate is
E{Profit} = ζτ. (32)
Meanwhile, the expected cost of issuing the request and waiting in the queue till acceptance is
E{Cost} = u0 + uE{wl}, (33)
where wl is the time a request must wait in queue until being accepted, when there are l − 1
other requests ahead of it.
Assume that the tenants can obtain the a priori knowledge about wl , self-evidently, a rational
tenant will issue the request if and only if E{Profit − Cost} ≥ 0, which can be described as a
binary decision model:
Db =
{
1 ζτ − u0 − uE{wl} ≥ 0;
0 otherwise,
(34)
where Db = 1 stands for issuing and Db = 0 for balking.
The rational strategy for reneging mostly follows the same principle, but slightly differs from
the balking case by concentrating on future cost and neglecting the sunken costs, i.e. the issuing
cost and the waiting cost already generated. For an arbitrary request at time t, denote with k(t)
its current position in queue, and with w(k) its remaining waiting time at position k, the tenant
is able to rationally choose whether to renege according to:
Dr(t) =
{
1 ζτ − uE {wk(t)} ≥ 0;
0 otherwise,
(35)
where Dr(t) = 1 indicates waiting and Dr(t) = 0 for reneging.
C. Rational balking without reneging
For simplification, we first ignore reneging, so that
E{wl} = l
µ
, (36)
Db =
{
1 τ ≥ u0µ+ulµζ
0 otherwise
. (37)
Hence, given certain ζ , u0 and u, it yields that Db = Db(l, τ) if the tenant is able to observe
l before pushing its request into the queue. The balking chance of such a tenant is therefore a
function of l under any certain distribution of τ:
b(l) =
∫ +∞
0
Db(l, t) fτ(t)dt =
∫ +∞
u0µ+ul
µζ
fτ(t)dt
= 1 − Fτ
(
u0µ + ul
µζ
) (38)
Particularly, when u0 = 0 and τ ∼ U(0, τmax ):
buni(l) =
{
1 − ulµζτmax 0 ≤ l ≤
µζτmax
u ;
0 otherwise,
(39)
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which is the linear balking model in [14]. Note that there is an implicit limit for the queue length
lmax =
µζτmax
u , even if no such limit is explicitly set by the MNO.
When u0 = 0 and fτ(t) = 1(t+1)2 (rational distribution):
brat(l) = 1 −
(
− 1
t + 1
) ulµζ
t=0
=
µζ
ul + µζ
=
µζ
u
l + µζu
. (40)
When u0 = 0 and τ ∼ Par(1, 1):
bpar(l) =

1 l = 0;
1 −
(
−1t
) ulµζ
t=1
=
µζ
u
l otherwise,
(41)
which is the hyperbolic balking model in [15] with the factor of patience β = µζu . Note that this
model assumes every slice remains active for at least an unit time period.
When u0 = 0 and τ ∼ Exp(η):
bexp(l) = 1 −
(−e−ηt )  ulµζt=0 = e− ηuζ lµ , (42)
which is the exponential balking model in [11] with the exponent of impatience β = ηuζ > 0.
D. Rational reneging
Now we consider the reneging behavior. As we will derive below, the decision of reneging
highly relies on the tenant’s knowledge of the queue. So we discuss this problem separately in
different cases.
1) Full knowledge: First, we assume that every tenant is not only able to observe the position
k of its request in the queue in real time, but also informed by the MNO about E {wk}. In this
case, Eq. (35) can be directly applied to determine the maximal waiting time tmax:
ζτ − uE{wk(tmax)} = 0, (43)
E{wk} =
k−1∑
i=0
1
µ +
∑i
j=0 ω j
, (44)
where ωi ≥ 0 is the reneging rate at the queue position i for i > 0 and ω0 = 0. Therefore, this
case has an equivalent form where the MNO informs the tenant that issues the k th request in
queue about µ and ωi for all i < k. The values of µ and ωi converge to stable levels in long term
when the business scenario remains consistent, therefore we consider them here as constants that
are known by the MNO.
2) Knowledge of serving rate: In this case, we assume that every tenant is informed by
the MNO about µ, and keeps observing the position k of its request in the queue, but has no
knowledge about ωi. As a tenant generally lacks knowledge of requests issued by other tenants,
i.e. the statistics of their parameters [u0, u, p, τ]. So no tenant is able to estimate the values of ωi
in this case, which disables the estimation of E {wk} according to Eq. (44). However, knowing
that ωi ≥ 0 for all i, the tenants can make conservative estimations based on
E {wk} =
k−1∑
i=0
1
µ +
∑i
j=0 ω j
≥ k
µ
, (45)
and therefore Eq. (35) becomes
Dr(t) =
{
1 k(t) ≤ µζτu ;
0 otherwise.
(46)
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3) Knowledge of position: In this case, every tenant is able to track its request’s current
position k in queue, but has no a priori knowledge about µ. Thus, the tenant has to estimate µ
through an online learning process while waiting in queue:
µˆ(k) = l − k
Tk
, (47)
where Tk is the time that the request took to arrive the k th position since its entrance to the
queue. Thus, Eqs. (45) and (46) become respectively
E {wˆk} =
k−1∑
i=0
1
µˆ(k) +∑ij=0 ω j ≥ kµˆ(k) = kTkl − k , (48)
Dr(t) =
{
1 k(t) ≤ lζτuTk(t)+ζτ ;
0 otherwise.
(49)
It has to be noted here that the estimation in Eq. (48) is only valid when k < l, and the
estimation error 2µ decreases as k increases. Therefore a threshold ∆K should be set whereas
µˆ(t) is estimated only when l − k ≥ ∆K . In summary:
Dr(t) =

1 k(t) < l − ∆K,
1 l − ∆K ≤ k(t) ≤ l(ζτuTk(t)+ζτ,
0 otherwise.
(50)
4) Knowledge of average waiting time: In this case, all tenants are only informed about the
average waiting time w since joining the queue till being served, in which the waiting time
requests that balk and renege do not count. Meanwhile, the current position in queue k is
unobservable for a request unless k = 0 (i.e. when the request gets served).
In this case, a request can only roughly consider all other requests ahead of it in queue as a
batch. Since the service to every single request is a Poisson event, we approximately consider
the complete service to this batch (of unknown length) as a Poisson event with arriving rate of
1/w. Thus, the reneging decision can be made as
Dr(t) =
{
1 ζτ − uw ≥ 0;
0 otherwise.
(51)
Note that Eq. (51) is independent of t or k so that it always returns the same decision.
5) Blindness: If the tenant possesses neither the position k of its waiting request in the queue,
nor any knowledge about the dynamics of queue, it can only make a blind reneging, where a
maximal waiting time is predetermined at the queue entrance. A straightforward solution is to
set a maximal cost proportional to the total profit that can be generated by the requested slice
upon admission:
umax = u0 + utmax =3 ζτ, (52)
where 3≥ 0 is the factor of risking that indicates the tenant’s intension of waiting in the queue.
This yields that
Dr(t) =
{
1 t < 3ζτ−u0u ,
0 otherwise.
(53)
It is worth to note that when u0 = 0 and τ ∼ Exp(η), the blind reneging model becomes the classic
reneging model [15] where the maximal waiting time is exponentially distributed. Furthermore,
when 3→ +∞ the tenants will never renege and therefore become patient.
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E. Balking with renaging
When tenants are able to renege on their requests and the issuing cost u0 = 0, the balking
behavior can be considered as a special case of reneging at the queue entrance (t = 0, k = l).
Clearly, this implies to disable balking in the aforementioned cases VI-D3 and VI-D5 where no
a priori estimation of E{w} is available for tenants.
VII. SLICE ADMISSION STRATEGY OPTIMIZATION
In slice admission control, there are various performance metrics that may include: the overall
network utility rate, the admission rate and the average request waiting time.
The network utility of a slice can be differently defined, such as the periodical payment u
that the MNO receives from the tenant, or the generated network throughput, etc. It is common
to consider the utility rate of a slice as determined by the slice type, and the overall network
utility rate at any time instant t as the sum of utility rates of all active slices:
uΣ(t) =
N∑
n=1
sn(t)un, (54)
where sn(t) is the number of type-n active slices at time t, and un is the utility rate of every
type-n slice. In long term, the average overall network utility rate can be estimated from the
acceptance and releasing rates of different slice types:
uΣ =
N∑
n=1
µnun
ηn
. (55)
The average waiting time of all requests in queues is
Wq =
N∑
n=1
Wq,nLn
N∑
n=1
Ln
. (56)
The overall admission rate is the following
P(A) =
∑N
n=1 λnP(An)∑N
n=1 λn
. (57)
All three criteria are determined by the request behavior parameters αn, βn, λn and the accep-
tance rate µn. Given a certain combination of [αn, βn, λn, ηn], µn is uniquely determined by the
MNO’s strategy, i.e. by the preference matrix Φ. Hence, with consistent behaviors of request
arrival and slice releasing, we can optimize either of them by selecting the best Φ.
A major challenge for analysis exists in the complex relation between the acceptance rates
[µ1, µ2, . . . , µN ] and the strategy Φ, as Φ does not directly imply the MNO’s action or statistics,
but only its preference.
Nevertheless, if the steady-state probability of queue lengths pn(l), as defined in Eq. (14), is
known or measurable for all n ∈ N , we can estimate µn for all n with respect to Φ and the
initial state sinit as follows.
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First, define a bijection S ↔ {1, 2, . . . , |S|} as J = JS(s) where JS(s) = IA(s) for all s ∈ A.
Then extend the definitions in Eqs. (4), (6) and (14) with
∆s0 = [0, 0, . . . , 0]︸        ︷︷        ︸
N
, (58)
φ˜i, j =
{
0 j > |A|
φi, j j ≤ |A| , ∀i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N + 1}, (59)
p0(0) = 0, (60)
respectively. The probability of state transition from any s ∈ S to s + ∆s can be then calculated
as
Prob(s→ s + ∆sn) =
n−1∏
k=1
pφ˜k,J (0)(1 − pφ˜n,J (0)). (61)
Thus, when the initial state sinit is known, we can obtain the long-term probability distribution
of system state s as
Prob(s j | sinit = si) = lim
K→∞
1
K
K∑
k=0
[Ψk]i, j, (62)
where Ψ is the transition matrix:
Ψ =

Ψ1,1 Ψ1,2 . . . Ψ1,|S|
Ψ2,1 Ψ2,2 . . . Ψ2,|S|
...
...
. . .
...
Ψ|S|,1 Ψ|S|,2 . . . Ψ|S|,|S|
 , (63)
and Ψi, j = Prob(si → s j).
More generally, if not the exact value but the probability distribution of the initial state is
available as Pinit = [pinit(s1), pinit(s2), . . . , pinit(s|S|)], the long-term probability distribution s is the
following
Prob(s j | Pinit) = lim
K→∞
1
K
K∑
k=0
|S|∑
i=1
pinit(s j)[Ψk]i, j . (64)
We can obtain the expected active slice number sn of every slice type n as a function of Ψ
and thus, as a function of Φ. Now, recalling Eqs. (54–55) it yields that
sn =
µn
ηn
, (65)
and then we can write the following
µn =
sn
ηn
=
∑
s∈S
Prob(s | Pinit)sn
ηn
=
1
ηn
∑
s∈S
lim
K→∞
1
K
K∑
k=0
|S|∑
i=1
pinit(s j)[Ψk]i, j .
(66)
Based on this analytical expression, we are able to optimize [µ1, µ2, . . . , µn] with respect to
Φ. However, it is evident that Eq. (66) is non-convex w.r.t. Φ, which prohibits analytical solution
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of the global optimum. On the other hand, the overall domain size of Φ is 2(N+1)|A|, which can
assume unaffordable high values for any realistic dimension of |A| in practical networks, making
the exhaustive search impossible. This is an integer linear programming (ILP) problem that is
proven to be NP-Hard, therefore advanced machine learning and heuristic search methods are
needed to solve it with affordable efforts of computation.
VIII. NUMERICAL SIMULATIONS
A. Simulating the decisions of impatient tenants
1) Simulation setup: In the numerical simulations we define a simplified scenario, where the
MNO holds a normalized two-dimensional (M = 2) resource pool r = [1, 1] and N = 2 different
slice types are defined and specified with the parameters listed in Table I. Note that we assume
the lifetime of every type-n slice is an exponentially distributed random variable τn ∼ Exp(ηn),
where 1/ηn is the average lifetime of type-n slices.
TABLE I: Specifications of the defined slice types.
Slice type (n) un λn 1/ηn u0,n un ζn
1 [0.01, 0.05] 6 5 0 1 8
2 [0.05, 0.01] 10 3 0 1.5 12
Under these specifications, the admissibility region A is composed of 341 different values of
s. For the sake of simplicity, we do not consider the option of “reserve” in the MNO’s slicing
strategy: in this way for every state s only two different preference vectors, i.e. ϕ1 = [1, 2, 0]
and ϕ2 = [2, 1, 0], are available. Therefore, there are in total 2341 different slicing strategies
applicable for the MNO. We randomly select 1000 from these valid slicing strategies, and with
every MNO slicing strategy, we evaluate the rational balking/reneging strategies of impatient
tenants with different information available. For every individual evaluation, we simulate the
arrivals of tenant requests and the MNO’s operations for 1000 periods. To mitigate divergences
of queue lengths, especially for the case of patient tenants, an upper bound of length is set to
100 for every queue.
2) Evaluation results: During the simulation, we track the end-profit of every issued slice
request defined as follows
ζe =
{
ζτ − u0 − uw accepted;
−u0 − uw reneged, (67)
TABLE II: Tenant profits in 1000 operation periods under different balking/reneging strategies,
“Patience” is the benchmark strategy where no balking or reneging takes place.
Case Total profit (×10
3) Mean profit Profiting chance
Type 1 Type 2 Type 1 Type 2 Type 1 Type 2
Patience 36.06 16.88 10.74 2.86 49.21% 40.48%
Blindness
3= 1 33.62 24.08 7.93 3.54 46.27% 43.47%
3= 0.1 110.89 139.23 18.45 13.90 25.42% 22.93%
3= 0.01 129.45 153.98 21.53 15.40 46.29% 43.39%
Knowledge of position (∆K = 2) 36.03 16.86 10.72 2.79 49.23% 40.47%
Knowledge of average waiting time 50.88 60.11 32.97 25.36 85.65% 79.18%
Knowledge of serving rate 93.12 100.07 57.17 43.25 94.80% 83.59%
Full knowledge 92.68 101.53 57.66 44.34 95.57% 83.87%
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where w is the total waiting time from queue entrance to admission/reneging. Then we evaluate
the balking/reneging strategies of tenants with three different metrics:
• Total profit: the sum of end-profits obtained by all issued slice requests;
• Mean profit: the average end-profit obtained by all issued slice requests;
• Profiting chance: the ratio of slice requests that lead to positive end-profits in all issued
requests.
The simulation results are listed in Table II.
It can be easily observed from the results that, given the knowledge about position of its request
in queue and the queue’s serving rate, a tenant has a high chance to make correct decisions of
balking and reneging. Thereby it is able to mitigate most losses caused by excessive waiting in
case of request congestion, and thus obtain a positive profit.
The information about reneging rates provides a further improvement in addition, but only
by an insignificant degree. One reason of this phenomena could be that, after a rational balking
with sufficient knowledge, the reneging rate of requests generally remains limited, and therefore
it exhibits a little impact on the waiting time in queue.
In contrast, when provided with only insufficient information, tenants are likely to benefit
less from their impatience. An impatient tenant knowing only the mean waiting time in queue
can reasonably avoid most extreme long waitings by balking, and therefore has more chance
to achieve a positive profit in comparison to patient tenants, yet significantly lower than the
tenants with full knowledge. The knowledge about current position of request in queue alone
fail to assist tenants with their decisions, resulting to a similar performance as that of the patient
tenants – which is the bound provided by the artificial queue truncation. Unwise decisions are
also made by the blind tenants that renege after predetermined waiting time, whose performance
strongly depends on the patience factor 3, and in the worse case even outperformed in profiting
chance by patient tenants.
In summary, network slice tenants need information about queue dynamics from the MNO—at
least the minimum information to enable balking—so that they can benefit from impatience in
case of slice requests congestion.
3) Distribution of reneging time: In Section VI-C, we have analytically proven the applicabil-
ity of various classical models of balking statistics in the slice admission control scenario upon
different distributions of the slice lifetime τ. The distribution of reneging time in SAC, however,
is relatively challenging to derive in such way.
To evaluate the applicability of existing reneging models, we execute additional numerical
simulations. The environment is configured to the same specifications listed in Table I, and
the tenants possess full knowledge of the queuing system. First we randomly generate 1000
different admission strategies, for every strategy we carry out 25 rounds of Monte-Carlo test, in
each round the MNO operates 40 periods. Then we fix the MNO to a static admission strategy
that ϕ = [2, 1, 0] for all s ∈ A, and repeat this test 1000 times, also with 25 rounds per time
and 40 operations periods per round. We observe the waiting time of all reneged requests and
illustrate the obtained results in Fig. 4. It can be observed that the exponential distribution
generally provides a satisfactory fit to the reneging time in most cases, which supports applying
the classical model proposed in [15] to simplify queue models from the MNO’s perspective.
However, it shall be remarked that in case of strong congestion where a queue can be extremely
long, e.g. Queue 1 in the fixed strategy test, the reneging time may become fat-tail distributed
and no more exponential.
4) Impatience model selection: Certainly, when fed with the knowledge of the current active
queues, tenants may be more encouraged to balk or renege from densely congested queues of
slice requests, which in turn leads to a decreased number of awaiting slice requests. Nevertheless,
19
          
Reneging time / operations period(s)
    
    
    
    
Ra
tio
 in
 a
ll 
sa
m
pl
es
 4 X H X H  
 4 X H X H  
 4 X H X H    I L W
 4 X H X H    I L W
(a) Random admission strategy
          
Reneging time / operations period(s)
    
    
    
    
    
Ra
tio
 in
 a
ll 
sa
m
pl
es
 4 X H X H  
 4 X H X H  
 4 X H X H    I L W
 4 X H X H    I L W
(b) Fixed admission strategy (prefer type 2)
Fig. 4: The distribution of tenant requests’ maximal waiting time in the scenario of multi-queue
slice admission control.
it should be noted that the phenomena of balking and reneging are only significant when the
queues are considerably long. In this case, the MNO’s resources are already sufficiently utilized,
and the utilization rate is hardly impacted by the impatience of tenants. On the other hand, if there
is a lack of information about the queues, as demonstrated in Section VIII-A2, tenants can suffer
from high probability of business loss. This will, self-evidently, suppress the tenants’ interest for
the MNO’s slice service on long-term windows, leading to a consistent loss of customers from
the MNO’s perspective. In summary, we can argue that it is a win-win option for the MNO to
share full knowledge of the queues, or at least the request’s current position in queue and the
serving rate of queue, to every awaiting tenant. In such context, we assert it to be reasonable
and rational to apply the models of exponential balking and reneging, as we did in Section V-D.
B. Simulating the heterogeneous multi-queue slice controller
To carry out simulations in a consistently specified environment, we consider the same scenario
as defined in Tab. I.
1) Verification of geometric IAT distribution: In case of patient tenants, Theorem 1 can also
be verified through numerical simulations. We consider all tenants as patient, and set an upper
bound of queue length to 100 for all queues to mitigate queue divergence. Then we randomly
generate 1000 slicing strategies, in which the resource reservation (n = 0) is always assigned
with the least preference. For each strategy, 25 rounds of Monte-Carlo tests are executed. In
each testing round, an MNO with a 2-queue slice admission controller is initialized to a random
but fully resource-utilized state, and then operates under the consistent strategy for 40 operations
periods. Then we investigate the distribution of inter-acceptance time (IAT) for each queue, and
attempt to fit the measurements with geometric distributions, which is the discrete-time version
of exponential distribution. Out of all the 25 000 tests, 99.948% IAT records were successfully
fitted by a Maximum-Likelihood-Estimator (MLE). A sample result is shown in Fig. 5(a), where
a good fitting performance can be observed.
To quantitatively evaluate the fitness, we compute the Kullback-Leibler divergence (KLD) [16]
for every strategy:
DKL(PIAT | Geom.) =
∞∑
k=0
pIAT(k) log pIAT(k)(1 − pˆ)k pˆ, (68)
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where pIAT(k) is the empirical probability mess function (PMF) of the measured IAT, and (1−pˆ)k pˆ
is the geometric PMF with fitted parameter pˆ. KLD is an indicator of fitness between two
distributions, which equals 0 for two identical distributions and approaches towards +∞ for two
completely irrelevant ones. The KLD distribution over all 25 000 tests is depicted in the left
part of Fig. 5(b), which shows a satisfactory fitness for both queues (slice types).
Furthermore, to verify the impact of impatient tenants’ behavior, we grant all tenants with full
knowledge about the queues to activate balking and reneging, and then repeat the aforementioned
simulation procedure. Only 20.568% of the measured IAT tracks can be successfully fitted with
the geometric distribution this time (on the rest measurements, the MLE fails to converge). The
KLD distribution of successfully fitted IAT tracks is illustrated in the right part of Fig. 5(b).
Compared to the case of patient tenants, we can observe a significant increase of KLD here,
confirming our assertion that the behaviors of balking and reneging will remove the Markovian
feature of the system. Remark that when the balking and reneging rates are low, such impact
can be slight enough to be neglected.
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Fig. 5: The IAT of every individual queue under an arbitrary strategy is geometrically distributed
if and only if the tenants are patient.
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Fig. 6: Performance distribution of the proposed multi-queue slice admission controller with
10 000 random strategies, in comparison to selected benchmarks.
2) Evaluation of the proposed controller: To verify the effectiveness and potential in opti-
mization of the proposed multi-queue slice admission controlling mechanism, we generate 10 000
random strategies, and measure all three above-mentioned performances metrics uΣ, Wq and P(A)
for every strategy in both reference scenarios 1 and 2. Similar to the last tests, every strategy is
evaluated through a 25-round Monte-Carlo test where each round begins with a random initial
state and lasts 40 operations periods. Impatient tenants are considered.
To provide benchmarks, we test the controller with two specific “naïve” strategies: Prefer type
1: the preference vector is [1, 2, 0] at all system states; Prefer type 2: the preference vector is
[2, 1, 0] at all system states. Moreover, we implement and test a simple “greedy” single-queue
slice admission controller that always accepts the first request in its queue regardless of type, as
long as the resource pool supports.
The results are illustrated in Fig. 6. It can be observed that the multi-queuing controller, when
specified with an appropriate strategy, outperforms the greedy single-queue solution in admission
rate, especially when the demand is dense and queues are congested. However, it shall be noted
that the performances highly rely on the selection of strategy, leading to a critical necessity of
strategy optimization.
IX. FURTHER DISCUSSION
In practical wireless networks, both the dynamics of resource availability (e.g. channel fading)
and the resource elasticity of active slices must be taken into account. The model in this paper
is an approximation with a static resource pool r and rigid slices, which holds in long-term with
appropriate dynamic scheduling to multiplex slices. Note that such a slice multiplexing implicitly
enables slice overbooking with a risk to break SLAs [17], [18]. The challenge of balancing the
multiplexing gain and the overbooking risk in heterogeneous multi-queue admission control
settings deserves future study.
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It shall also be noticed that the assumptions of Poisson arrivals/releases may not hold in
some practical service scenarios. In this case, the queues are not M/M/1 systems and cannot
be considered as continuous-time Markov systems. Nevertheless, as pointed out in [11], many
such continuous-time non-Markov processes can be easily transformed into discrete-time Markov
chains by observing only the state transitions. Therefore, the analyses given above also apply to
most scenarios with non-Poisson request arrivals/releases.
X. RELATED WORK
We summarize in the following the main research effort in the literature on different topics,
such as Slice-as-a-Service, queuing theory for cloud services and network slicing admission
control.
An overview on multi-tenancy service and 5G network slicing is given in [3] from perspectives
of architecture and standardization, introducing the novel concept of network slice broker, which
executes the admission control. Different attempts have been made in [5], [8], [19] and [20]
to demonstrate how the admission control can benefit the overall network resource utilization.
In [21], a robust network slicing mechanism by addressing the slice recovery and reconfiguration
in a unified framework Additionally, in [22] a multi-queuing system for heterogeneous tenant
requests is modelled to derive statistical behavior models showing how this can be approximated
to a Markovian system. However, none of the above-mentioned works have addressed the option
of allowing infrastructure provider to share information with upcoming tenants so as to improve
the overall system performance while, at the same time, formulating a network slice admission
optimization problem based on a novel utility model.
While we have considered network slicing in a generic and abstracted view, which is generally
applicable in both radio access network (RAN) and core network (CN) domains, recently there
has been a dense specific research interest for RAN slicing and its impact on radio resource
management (RRM). On that [23] and [24] provide interesting solutions for efficient resource
management and orchestration. From the perspective of slicing admission strategy optimization,
the methods reported in [5], [7], [8] can be worthwhile to refer. A dynamic resource controller
for vRANs based on deep reinforcement learning is presented in [25], where the authors also
showed a real implementation over different platforms. The authors of [26] introduces a novel
framework for RAN slicing by showing performance requirements in terms of the required
number of resources per deadline interval. Although all these works only consider a binary
decision mechanism where declined requests simply vanish instead of being served after a delay,
the algorithms deployed by them to solve ILP problems will inspire future development of model-
less heuristic strategy optimizers for the proposed multi-queue slice admission controller.
SlaaS shall be considered as a specific type of public cloud environment, where service ses-
sions can be categorized into multiple types with significantly heterogeneous resource demands.
Queuing theory has been widely applied for cloud computing services to model the statistics
of service demand and delivered quality of service (QoS), such as [27] and [28]. Especially,
service schedulers with heterogeneous queues for different service types are discussed in [29]
and [30]. In addition, [31] relates to multi-resource sharing between flows with heterogeneous
requirements providing a convergence proof. These models provide valuable reference views in
addition to the model proposed in this paper. Finally, balking and reneging behavior of impatient
clients in queuing systems are extensively studied in [32], [33].
Differing from the aforementioned works wherein a “strategy” usually represents the decision
as a function of the system state, our study proposes a novel mechanism of multi-queuing slice
admission control where the slicing strategy represents the MNO’s preference of slice types in
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different system states. Besides, out paper also considers impatient tenants, which, from the best
of our knowledge, has never been investigated in SlaaS environments.
XI. CONCLUSION
The network slicing paradigm is expected to play a key-role in next generation networks
design. However, devising an admission control solution that takes into account complex network
tenants behaviors involves a large number of challenges.
In this paper, we have proposed a multiservice-based network slicing controller that automati-
cally accounts for tenants waiting to get their network slices request granted given certain request
frequency and patience characteristics. Our results show that i) unexpected tenants behaviors may
be modeled with advanced admission control policies, ii) the decisions of rational impatient
tenants can be mapped onto classical queuing-theoretic models comprising balk and renege
parameters and iii) numerical simulations closely follow the exponential balking/reneging models
derived.
APPENDIX
THE STEADY STATE PROBABILITY OF QUEUE WITH EXPONENTIAL BALKING AND RENEGING
Consider the queue of type-n requests where the request arriving rate is λn, the request serving
rate is µn, the reneging factor is αn and the balking factor is 1 − e−βnl/µn . Let pn(l, t) denote
the transient probability the queue contains l requests at the time instant t, we can write the
transition equations of the dynamic queue state:
∂p′n(0, t)
∂t
= − λnpn(0, t) + µnpn(1, t), (69)
∂p′n(0, t)
∂t
= −
(
λne−βn/µn + µn
)
pn(1, t) + λnpn(0, t) + (µn + αn)pn(2, t), (70)
∂p′n(0, t)
∂t
= −
(
λne−βnl/µn + µn + (l − 1)αn
)
pn(l, t) + λne−βn(l−1)/µnpn(l − 1, t) (71)
+ (µn + lαn)pn(l + 1, t), l ∈ {3, 4, 5, . . . }.
Let γn = µn/αn, κn(l) = λne−γnl/µn , the steady-state equations are therefore
0 = − κn(0)pn(0) + γnpn(1) (72)
0 = − (κn(1) + γn)pn(1) + κn(0)pn(0) + (γn + 1)pn(2) (73)
0 = − (κn(l) + γn + l − 1) pn(l) + κn(l − 1)pn(l − 1) + (γn + l)pn(l + 1), l ∈ {3, 4, 5, . . . } (74)
From the steady-state equations we have
pn(l) = κn(l − 1)
γn + l − 1pn(l − 1) = pn(0)
l∏
i=1
κn(i)
γn + i
= pn(0)λne
−iβn/µn
µn + iαn
, l ∈ N+. (75)
Knowing that
+∞∑
l=0
pn(l) = 1, pn(0) can be calculated as
pn(0) = 1
/(
1 +
+∞∑
l=1
l∏
i=1
λne−iβn/µn
µn + iαn
)
. (76)
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